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Abstract: One of the main criticisms of object-oriented ontology in its current formulation by Graham Harman 
is that it includes a notion of time that, upon closer inspection, renders the overall theory inconsistent. I 
argue that while this is indeed the case, Harman’s notion of time can be modified in a way that leaves the 
framework of object-oriented ontology intact. More specifically, Harman’s theory of time as a single surface 
tension between sensual objects and their qualities should be expanded into a theory of time as a twofold 
of related yet irreducible temporalities. Such a theory can already be found in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of 
Sense. I argue that much of the latter theory is already tacitly presupposed in Harman’s ontology, and show 
that the proposed modification successfully addresses the most salient criticisms that have been voiced at 
Harman’s notion of time.
Keywords: Object-oriented ontology, time, temporality, Graham Harman, Gilles Deleuze, Aion, Chronos
1  For Better or Worse
If criticism could kill, object-oriented philosophy would certainly be a corpse by now. Just recall some 
of the grave sins of which it has been accused. First, rooting itself in what eminent philosophers have 
already denounced as pseudo-problems. Second, relying on straw man tactics when interpreting other 
philosophies. Third, daring to propose an ontology without first providing an epistemology. Fourth, not 
giving the natural sciences and mathematics their due. Fifth, advocating an objectionable politics, or 
at the very least undermining our ability to think politically. And finally, corrupting gullible minds with 
deceivingly seductive styles of writing.
For some, such criticisms suffice to pronounce the death of the genre. According to Ray Brassier, for 
example, their combined force amounts to a “speculative autopsy” of especially Graham Harman’s object-
oriented ontology (OOO).1 Others, myself included, might not be so sure, if only because it could be possible 
to adapt instead of abandon the theory in response to its criticisms. This will surely sound naive to those 
who have already consigned object-oriented ontology to the grave. Yet such detractors should remember 
that, for better or worse, it often takes decades of refinement and revision before a philosophy reaches its 
mature form. Given that object-oriented ontology is still a young philosophy, it seems logical to improve 
rather than abandon it in response to serious criticism. Such an attempt should obviously not focus on 
peripheral objections, but concern itself with criticisms that go straight to the heart of the theory.
In my view, this leads us to the notion of time in OOO. One of the most salient criticisms of Harman’s 
philosophy is that its notion of time as a superficial phenomenon which does not affect real objects renders 
1 See Brassier, “Postscript: Speculative Autopsy” in Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy. Also note that in this article, 
‘OOO’ will exclusively refer to Harman’s ontology, unless stated otherwise.
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/19 9:15 AM
540   A. Kleinherenbrink
his entire ontology inconsistent.2 As we will see, Peter Gratton and Peter Wolfendale both argue that a 
flawed notion of time is the most problematic aspect of OOO. My argument in this article will be that 
Harman’s current theory of time is indeed flawed, but that it can be modified into a more consistent and 
coherent theory while retaining the general framework of his ontology.
Section 2 outlines some key features of Harman’s object-oriented ontology. Section 3 discusses Harman’s 
theory of time and its respective criticisms by Wolfendale and Gratton.3 Sections 4 and 5 then argue that 
in light of these criticisms, Harman’s notion of time should be modified into a twofold notion of time that 
was originally proposed by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense. Section 4 first shows how surprisingly similar 
the model of reality that animates the pages of The Logic of Sense is to that of OOO, and then reconstructs 
Deleuze’s theory of twofold time. Section 5 demonstrates that this theory can be incorporated into Harman’s 
ontology with relative ease, and then argues that this modification constitutes an adequate response to 
Wolfendale and Gratton. By way of conclusion, I discuss how the surprising compatibility of a Deleuzian 
theory of time with Harman’s fourfold model of entities sheds new light on the perceived ‘distance’ between 
Deleuze’s and Harman’s philosophies.
2  Fourfold Objects
The central principle of OOO is that objects can neither be reduced to their components, nor to their relations 
with surrounding entities, nor to a combination of both. Real objects “withdraw” from their engagements 
with humans and non-humans alike, such that real objects are never fully present in (the sum of) their 
parts and their effects on others.4 This is an ontological rather than an epistemological thesis. It does not 
mean that studying the components or effects of objects never yields knowledge. It means that objects can 
never be nothing but those components and effects. It is also important to stress that OOO uses the term 
‘object’ in a very general sense. Rocks, bicycles, chemicals, and buildings are objects, but so are hailstorms, 
people, rivers, festivals, songs, bacteria, cities, and marriages. The claim is that all of these could count as 
real objects in so far as none of them could be reduced to their components or effects.
Harman calls attempts to reduce objects to their parts or an underlying element “undermining.”5 
Examples include pre-Socratic philosophies that reduce all entities to primordial physical elements, 
scientistic theories that reduce reality to subatomic particles, and continental philosophies holding that 
individual entities are but momentary concretions of an amorphous and indeterminate ‘something’ that 
lurks behind ordinary reality (Harman ascribes this thesis to Jean-Luc Nancy as well as Emmanuel Levinas).6
The main reason to reject undermining is that it cannot explain emergence, as objects have properties 
not found in the elements from which they originate.7 A human being, for example, has numerous properties 
that would not exist if their constituent physical parts would be scattered across the universe. Objects are also 
relatively independent of their parts in that they can gain and lose parts without ceasing to be themselves. A 
university, for instance, can gain and lose students, buildings, researchers, and programs without ceasing 
to be that specific university. OOO therefore refuses to conflate production with reducibility. It is obviously 
the case that objects are produced by other entities, but it does not follow that they are nothing but these 
entities. By way of analogy, think of how the simple fact that batteries can generate electricity does not 
imply the absurdity that electricity would somehow be nothing but batteries.
The reduction of objects to how they affect other entities is called “overmining.”8 The problem with 
overmining is that it cannot explain change, “since it requires that things be entirely expressed in the world 
2 Someone might argue that the main issue is instead that contra Harman, one simply cannot do ontology without first 
developing an epistemology. I disagree, but my argument is beyond the scope of this (as well as an) article.
3 Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy, 188-199; Gratton, Speculative Realism, 98-107.
4 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 7.
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here and now, with no portion of the things lying outside their interactions with other things.”9 If all entities 
would be nothing but their current apprehension by others, all of reality would be locked in permanent 
stasis. To help grasp this idea, take the example of a thousand people attending a Kendrick Lamar concert. 
An overmining philosophy would hold that at any given moment, Kendrick Lamar is nothing but his being 
experienced by his audience (plus how he may or may not simultaneously affect a host of other entities). 
But if that is the case, it would be impossible for Kendrick Lamar to ever transition from one song into the 
next, as his being would be utterly exhausted by the audience’s current experience of his performance of 
the current song. Moreover, an overmining position would imply the absurdity that someone who arrives 
late to the concert can never start looking at Kendrick Lamar, because only experiences of Kendrick Lamar 
would exist. The last person to arrive could only start experiencing other people’s experiences, and this 
would of course also be the case for those people. There would be more than a thousand people who only 
experience the experiences of others, without there ever being an entity that they actually experience. This 
is clearly nonsensical. If things can be affected, there must be things and not just further affections of which 
affections are affections. Harman therefore concludes that objects must always be more than the sum of 
how they are currently registered by other entities.10
As soon as the irreducibility of objects is established, we can deduce that they must have a fourfold 
ontological structure.11 First, if an object is “irreducible to its own pieces, and equally irreducible to its 
outward relations with other things,” then it must be a real object that constitutes an ontological excess over 
and above its parts and engagements.12 Second, it cannot be the case that what other entities experience, 
register, or apprehend is ever this real object, because that would overmine the object into its relations 
with others.  What manifests in an object’s relations with others is instead a sensual object, which is a 
translation of a real object into the experience of some other entity.13 In perceiving a river, for example, it 
is obviously not the case that the river itself is literally present in my consciousness. I merely perceive a 
derived or translated manifestation of the real river, with the latter withdrawing behind the sensual surface 
with which I am confronted.
Next, sensual objects cannot be bare particulars. If objects only ever encounter the sensual surface of 
other objects, then the fact that different encounters have different effects on different objects demands 
that sensual objects have specific qualities. In Harman’s terms, sensual objects must be “encrusted” with 
sensual qualities.14 At this point, a Humean might say that the notion of sensual qualities renders sensual 
objects superfluous. The manifest content of experience would simply be qualities such as ‘red,’ ‘round,’ and 
‘sweet,’ and the perceiving entity would generalize these into something like ‘apple’ by force of habit. OOO, 
however, follows Edmund Husserl in holding that sensual objects are initially given rather than habitually 
synthesized.15 If I take a walk around a brutalist building, for example, different colors and features slide in 
and out of view as I circle the structure. Due to variations in mood, lighting and background, it may appear 
as an intimidating and ugly lump of concrete in one moment, while striking me as an inspiring monument 
to human ingenuity in the next. OOO holds that this testifies to the existence of a building that is given 
in experience but not constituted by experience. The shifting play of qualities signals that the building is 
robust with regards to how it is perceived and used, such that the same building persists throughout the 
manifold ways in which it is encountered.
Finally, it cannot be the case that the withdrawn aspect of an object comprises nothing but a real object 
full stop. On this point, Harman follows Leibniz’ argument that monads must be more than simple unities, 
9 Ibid.
10 Since two wrongs do not make a right, it should be obvious that nothing is solved by combining an undermining approach 
with an overmining one. For those in doubt, see Harman, The Quadruple Object, 13-16.
11 Many questions can of course be raised with regards to each element of this fourfold structure, and much of Harman’s 
published work consists in addressing such questions. Since my focus here is on the specific problem of time in OOO, I bracket 
all other possible objections for the sake of the argument.
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because they also need to have individual qualities to be this rather than that monad.16 In a similar vein, real 
objects must have real qualities if they are to differ from one another and if there is to be sufficient reason 
for why the sensual manifestations of one object differ from those of the next. Hence the fourfold structure 
of objects. On the one hand, a twofold of a real object and its real qualities comprises an irreducible essence 
that withdraws from how the object is perceived or registered by others.17 On the other hand, a twofold of 
a sensual object and its shifting sensual qualities constitutes the presence of the object to other entities.
Before moving on, it is important to stress two features of OOO that are pertinent to what follows: 
ontological finitude and unilateral openness. Starting with the first, it is not the case that only humans are 
consigned to a world of sensual surfaces that preclude direct contact with other real objects. All objects 
are confronted with this ontological finitude, as no entity ever makes direct contact with another real 
object:
When I look at a chair, make theories about chairs, produce chairs in factories, or simply use chairs, I fail to exhaust their 
full reality. But the same happens when a lizard walks across the chair, when a hat is sitting on it, when raindrops strike it, 
or when a fire begins to burn the chair. In all these cases, objects fail to exhaust each other’s reality.18
The duel between withdrawn objects and their sensual surfaces as well as the distorting translation of 
essences into manifest appearances is thus not a tragic human handicap, but an ontological fact.19 All that 
any object ever registers are sensual objects and their qualities.
Second, unilateral openness is the fact that even though real objects are never directly experienced by 
other entities, only real objects themselves experience other entities. (Incidentally, anyone who thinks that 
the term ‘experience’ is too anthropomorphic is more than welcome to mentally replace it with ‘apprehend’ 
or ‘register’). In OOO, there is no such thing as a sensual object that experiences something, because sensual 
objects are merely what something else experiences. The experiencing object must therefore always be a 
real object.20 When I spot my girlfriend on a busy street, for instance, the entity seeing her is me qua real 
object and not me qua sensual object, as the latter would imply the absurdity that she is seen by someone 
else’s perception of me. Or to give another example: given that oceans, hounds, and humans are all affected 
by the moon in various ways, what affects them are sensual manifestations of the moon, but the entities 
that register these affections are all real objects.
3  The Problem of Time
If fourfold objects are the most basic ingredients of reality, as OOO holds, then such objects cannot exist 
in something that is not itself (an aspect of) another such object. It follows that OOO must account for 
all salient features of reality in terms of the four aspects of objects and the ten possible “links” between 
them (six links between the four aspects and four links that refer each respective aspect to itself).21 So too 
for space and time, which according to Harman must be explained in terms of “the polarization between 
objects and their qualities.”22 Since it is time that concerns us here, for now we simply note in passing 
that Harman defines space as the tension between a real object and its sensual qualities.23 That there is 
16 Ibid., 49; Leibniz, The Monadology, §8. Also consider that if real objects did not have real qualities, then due to the principle 
of the identity of indiscernibles, only one real object would exist. This implies a regress into an undermining position, and it 
would render the notions of change, emergence, and diversity unintelligible.
17 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 101.
18 Harman, “Strange Realism: On Behalf of Objects,” 12.
19 Harman, “The Road to Objects,” 174.
20 Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos,” 11.
21 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 78, 114-115. Harman divides these links into three groups (tensions, radiations, and 
junctions), but that typology is irrelevant to the current analysis.
22 Ibid., 100.
23 Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos,” 17. My claim is not that Harman’s notion of space is unproblematic, but that the 
proposed modification of his notion of time can be realized without analyzing his notion of space in full detail.
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space rather than an utterly immediate compression of everything would be due to the fact that real objects 
withdraw behind their sensual manifestations, thereby literally ‘making room.’
Harman defines time as the tension between sensual objects and their sensual qualities.24 He bases this on 
what he takes to be our common experience of time as “a remarkable interplay of stability and change.”25 On the 
one hand, experience presents us with shifting combinations of smells, sounds, colors, and other qualities. On 
the other hand, “experience does not decay in each instant into an untethered kaleidoscope of discontinuous 
sensations; instead, there seem to be sensual objects of greater or lesser durability.”26 This corresponds to the 
tension between sensual objects and the qualities with which they are encrusted.27 If we return to the example 
of the brutalist building, the different ways in which the same building strikes me as I circle it would strictly 
speaking not happen in time, because this dynamic of change and sameness would itself be time.
This dynamic does not happen in a vacuum, because sensual objects are objects that are related to. In 
the example, I am the real object that apprehends the temporal play between the building and its varying 
qualities. Moreover, I do not encounter the building in the void, but rather within one or several other 
real objects.28 Yet all such real objects “are in a sense outside time.”29 According to OOO, the real brutalist 
building withdraws from its sensual appearances, so it cannot be involved in the temporal play between 
sensual object and sensual qualities that I perceive. The same goes for myself as a real object that observes 
this play. I may experience a temporal phenomenon, but since time is strictly defined as the tension between 
sensual objects and their qualities, the apprehension itself is somehow not temporal. Finally, something 
similar must be true for whichever real object is the medium or milieu in which I encounter the building: 
even though this mediating object is the site of a temporal phenomenon, it is by definition not involved in 
that particular phenomenon.
Some of the main criticisms of Harman’s notion of time are those by Peter Gratton and Peter Wolfendale.30 
Neither author holds that Harman’s notion time is the only problematic part of his ontology, but both agree 
that it is the most problematic part. According to Gratton, the very future of object-oriented ontology as 
a viable theory hinges on whether or not it can provide an adequate theory of time.31 Wolfendale is even 
fiercer and holds that Harman’s current notions of time and space are “the most catastrophically inept 
aspect of his metaphysical system.”32
Gratton notes that “if Harman is to give content to objects, […] there is the risk of an idealism worse than 
anything he critiques.”33 This would not be an idealism that asserts an identity between being and thought 
or experience, but an idealism of ideal forms that dwell in an eternal present, unchanging and unaffected 
by the further vicissitudes of reality.34 These ideal forms would be the essences of entities (real objects 
with real qualities as ‘content’). The problem here is not that Harman’s ontology would no longer qualify 
as a realism, as it would simply be realist about ideal forms. The problem is that if real objects are outside 
24 Ibid., 17; Harman, The Quadruple Object, 100.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Harman, “The Road to Objects,” 176; “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos,” 17.
28 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 250-251.
29 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 215. 
30 There is also Tristan Garcia’s critique (cf. Garcia, “Crossing Ways of Thinking”). Yet this critique hinges on a far more 
basic disagreement between Garcia and Harman. Garcia denies that entities have a substantial excess over and above their 
components and effects. He defines entities as a difference rather than a content between their parts and their environment. This 
leads Garcia to deny that entities have identity over time, meaning that a car one second ago is not the same entity as the car 
right now (it is now in a slightly different set of other entities, meaning that it is now a different difference and thus a different 
entity). Since my concern here is with a theory of time that coheres with an ontology that does ascribe substantial being to 
entities, I postpone comparing Harman’s ontology Garcia’s to a future date.
31 Gratton, Speculative Realism, 107, 202.
32 Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy, 188, cf. 198. Note that Wolfendale identifies separate problems with regards to 
space and time in OOO, and holds that the latter are more fundamental: “If [Harman’s account of space] is bad, the situation is 
much worse when it comes to Harman’s account of ‘time’” (ibid., 195).
33 Gratton, Speculative Realism, 99.
34 Ibid.
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time, they can neither come into existence, nor change, nor perish, as these are kinds of change: “how does 
change come about to the real thing, which […] ‘endures’ and is outside the play of time at the sensuous 
level?”35 This point is also raised by Wolfendale:
Things must change within the subterranean realm of withdrawn objects, even if we only experience the ripples these 
changes produce in the glimmering surface world. These real changes and the time they presuppose are explicitly not 
accounted for by what passes for ‘time’ at the level of sensual change […].36
If real rather than sensual change does not exist, then all of reality is merely a passive representation of an 
unchanging set of immutable real objects with unalterable qualities, which would make OOO precisely the 
kind of undermining theory that it claims to overcome.
Moreover, it should be noted that Harman explicitly holds that any given real object will sometimes 
undergo real change, as it will go through “several turning-points in its lifespan, but not many.”37 In his 
recent Immaterialism, he outlines a theory of ‘symbiotic change’ according to which some but not all 
of an object’s encounters will alter its real qualities. By analogy, compare this to how most of our daily 
interactions do not fundamentally alter our personalities, but there will still be relatively rare moments 
when something deeply affects us and changes who we are. According to Harman, this is the model for 
real change in humans as well as zebras, bicycles, governments, and emeralds. In light of the unilateral 
openness mentioned earlier, this is certainly not precluded by the basic tenets of OOO, but it is obvious that 
Harman’s theory of time needs to be reworked if it is to account for real objects undergoing real change.
Closely related to this are two further problems identified by Wolfendale. First, despite restricting time 
to the tension between a sensual object and its sensual qualities, Harman uses unmistakably temporal terms 
to define the nine other links between the four aspects of objects. Take someone who returns to a place that 
has undergone significant changes since their last visit – say that I return to the neighborhood where I grew 
up, but all the houses have been demolished and replaced by factories. According to Harman, this change 
in the “regime of objects” is not a temporal shift, but a spatial one. Recall that space was defined as the 
tension between real objects and their sensual qualities. For Harman, the change that I notice is due to the 
fact that the colors, smells, shapes, and sounds in which I find myself immersed are sensual manifestations 
of new real objects that have replaced those that once existed there.38 He explicitly refers to this as “spatial 
changes.”39 Wolfendale rightfully points out that since any notion of change presupposes a notion of time, 
this is incoherent.40 If time is the tension between sensual object and sensual qualities, and if space is instead 
the tension between a real object and those sensual qualities, then change simply cannot pertain to space.
Another example would be the link of “contiguity” between sensual objects.41 Sensual objects “cannot 
make contact except through the deputy or mediator who experiences them.”42 To use one of Harman’s 
examples, an aggregate of spires and towers only constitutes a skyline in so far as an observer links these 
sensual objects into a skyline in their experience. Yet this also implies time. Say that I am ascending a hill 
and an increasing number of structures comes into view. A contiguity between sensual objects is thus being 
forged as more sensual objects are added to my skyline experience. This implies that the sensual realm does 
not just contain the temporal play between sensual objects and their shifting qualities, but also a similar 
play of varying associations between sensual objects themselves. Yet if time is merely the tension between a 
sensual object and its qualities, this should be impossible. Similar things happen in Harman’s descriptions 
of the seven remaining links, but since the general problem should be clear from the two examples just 
given, there is no need to discuss the rest in full detail.
35 Ibid., 103, cf. 106.
36 Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy, 199.
37 Harman, Immaterialism, 47.
38 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 251.
39 Ibid., 252.
40 Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy, 196-197.
41 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 128.
42 Ibid., 74.
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The second related problem concerns the simple fact that real objects and their real qualities are supposed 
to persist.43 Much of Harman’s ontology hinges on real objects and their qualities not being dissolved into 
their current engagements with other entities, as such dissolution would constitute overmining. Real 
objects must thus persist ‘beyond’ their sensual surfaces, but this is a meaningless statement as long as 
such persistence is not somehow temporal. As Wolfendale writes, this implies a tacit reliance on a second 
kind of “deep time” that OOO does not account for in its current formulation.44
A modified version of Harman’s theory of time must therefore meet at least three criteria. First, it must 
allow for the production, alteration, and annihilation of real objects with real qualities, and do so in a way 
that implies neither undermining nor overmining (recall Harman’s thesis that real change is rare, such that 
objects are not swept away by their engagements). Second, it must allow the ten links between aspects of 
the fourfold to be temporal, because these links refer to what happens in reality. Third and finally, it must 
account for the persistence of objects, but without positing a time that would exist over and above objects, 
as this would violate the thesis that objects are the basic constituents of reality.
4  Deleuze and Twofold Time
We are looking for a notion of time that accounts for the temporality of sensual as well as real objects, plus 
the temporality of the links between those levels. Such a notion is found in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of 
Sense, which theorizes time as a twofold of “Aion” and “Chronos.”45 Some may think that Deleuze theorizes 
time as a threefold rather than a twofold, given his elaborate descriptions of three temporal syntheses 
in Difference and Repetition and elsewhere.46 Yet these three syntheses concern what entities do in time, 
not time proper. This will still sound vague for the moment, but the next section will discuss the status of 
temporal syntheses within a theory of twofold time in more detail.
The Logic of Sense cannot be understood without grasping its profound difference from Difference and 
Repetition, even if the former was published only one year after the latter (1969 and 1968, respectively). 
According to the well-known metaphysics of Difference and Repetition, our everyday reality of seemingly 
discrete and discontinuous individual entities is the passive result of mutually continuous yet self-
differentiating processes which unfold in an intensive “virtual realm,” a realm that is different in kind 
from the extensive actuality that our senses perceive.47 In Harman’s terms, this would be an undermining 
position, as individual entities would be passive expressions of a more fundamental, pre-individual 
dimension. In a preface to The Logic of Sense, Deleuze explicitly distances himself from this virtual realm 
metaphysics, writing that it still amounted to a theory of “archaic depth” and that The Logic of Sense is 
instead about a new theory of “surfaces.”48 Indeed, throughout the thirty-four sections that comprise the 
book, there is not a single mention of the virtual realm that animates the pages of Difference and Repetition.
The general outline of this new ‘theory of surfaces’ is immediately clear from the first sections of The 
Logic of Sense, and observant readers will notice its proximity to Harman’s object-oriented metaphysics. 
Deleuze posits a metaphysics premised on a “dualism of bodies or states of affairs and effects or incorporeal 
events […].”49 A body should be understood as a “substance and cause” with its own “physical qualities,” 
and Deleuze adds that each body “withdraws” (se retire) from other bodies.50 Conversely, incorporeal 
events are merely “quasi-causes” that depend on bodies for their “real causes.”51 Events also have their 
43 Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy, 198.
44 Ibid.
45 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 58-65. My argument here in no way concerns Deleuze’s wider philosophy, but rather how (part 
of) Deleuze’s theory of time gives us the conceptual tools needed to render Harman’s philosophy more coherent. For a more 
extensive study of time in Deleuze’s work, see Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time.
46 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70-128.
47 Ibid., 88, 171.
48 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 65.
49 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 2.
50 Ibid., 7, 4, 6.
51 Ibid., 6.
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own qualities, which Deleuze calls “attributes.”52 These events and their attributes form the world of 
sensuous experience, including trees that greet us with their green foliage, scalpels that redden our skin, 
and battles that ravage our lands.53 If bodies withdraw from each other, this is because incorporeal events 
“envelop” bodies and thereby prevent them from making direct contact.54 In this sense, incorporeal events 
are “impassible.”55 Reality is thus ‘deeper’ than the manifest surfaces of incorporeal events, but this is no 
longer the depth of a unified and continuous virtual realm. Instead, it is the “depth” of bodies themselves 
as they withdraw behind their surfaces.56
As an aside, we also encounter this model of reality in Deleuze’s second edition of Proust and Signs. 
Originally published in 1964, Deleuze added an entire second part to the 1972 version. The newly added 
text outlines a theory of bodies considered as “closed vessels” that “communicate only indirectly” because 
they only ever register each other’s “signs.”57 In a striking resemblance to Harman’s ten links between the 
four aspects of objects, Deleuze writes that such a theory of reality entails a “galactic structure” of “ten 
combinations” between the various aspects of such entities.58
According to the metaphysics of The Logic of Sense, bodies can be produced and altered.59 Those familiar 
with the book will recall that Deleuze vehemently argues against ‘Platonic’ theories in which sensible reality 
is a representation of eternal and unchanging forms. To avoid regressing into such ‘Platonism’, bodies must 
be things that happen and change. This is why Deleuze sometimes also writes about real bodies in terms of 
events, for example when describing a battle or a human life as an “Event,” written with a capital E to avoid 
confusing an entity with its superficial manifestations.60 Deleuze is also aware that if bodies are produced 
and altered, then this must involve incorporeal events, as a body never makes direct contact with another 
body. Hence surface events must be the products of bodies while also featuring in the production of bodies.61 
This leads Deleuze to a twofold theory of time. On the one hand, there is the time of incorporeal events, 
the time of that which real bodies apprehend. On the other hand, there is the time of what happens to 
these bodies themselves.62 As Deleuze writes, “time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though 
mutually exclusive fashions.”63 He calls the time of bodies “Chronos” and refers to the time of incorporeal 
events as “Aion.”64
Before we move on, it is important to emphasize that Deleuze does not adhere to our habitual way 
of talking about the past as something that was present, the present as something that is present, and 
the future as something that will be present. When writing about the present, he (mostly) refers to what 
happens to real bodies, and when writing about the past and future, he (mostly) refers to how incorporeal 
events transpire. With this in mind, we proceed.
Aion is the “time of events-effects” on the surface of entities, which refers to the varying play of 
incorporeal events and their qualities.65 As opposed to the present of real bodies, which “exist,” events 
in Aion “subsist and insist.”66 This sounds like scholastic nitpicking, but it simply means that the play of 
52 Ibid., 94.
53 Ibid., 10.
54 Ibid., 10, 111, 124-5, 273-4.
55 Ibid., 124.
56 Ibid., 222.
57 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 174-5.
58 Ibid.
59 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 89.
60 Ibid., 100, 170
61 Ibid., 124.
62 Deleuze’s theory may very well accord with Timothy Morton’s OOO model of time. Morton writes: “Objects don’t sit in some 
kind of rigid temporal box. Instead, they are ‘internally’ out of phase with themselves, and this is what produces time and the 
possibility that they can interact” (Realist Magic, 177). This implies two distinct senses of time: one for an object’s existence 
amongst other entities, and then another one for its existence in a tensed relation – ‘out of phase’ – with itself.
63 Ibid., 5, cf. 132.
64 Ibid., 61.
65 Ibid., 62, 165, 166.
66 Ibid., 53.
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events only exists relative to something else, as surface events only ever transpire in relation to bodies that 
apprehend them. There is therefore a sense in which Aion constitutes a present.67 Your current experience 
of reading this article, possibly with a cup of coffee next to you and with music playing in the background, 
is an ‘Aionic’ manifold of tightly interwoven incorporeal events. Yet there is an even stronger sense in which 
Aion has “freed itself of its present corporeal content,” such that “only the past and future inhere or subsist 
in [it].”68 Incorporeal events are produced by bodies (recall that Deleuze calls bodies causes). Since bodies 
are never encountered directly, the shifting play of experience is nothing but the transition from incorporeal 
events that these bodies have produced (past) into incorporeal events that these bodies will produce (future). 
Humans can artificially extract a single moment from this variation and call it ‘the present,’ but we can 
never make the body that is the cause of such an event present to our experience. We can attend to any given 
moment in our past, present, or (imagined) future, but all we ever find are series of incorporeal events that 
were produced and transitioned into further events that were then produced. This is why Aion “divides itself 
infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present.”69 Note that this is not unique to our human 
experience of the world. All other entities also only ever apprehend the flow of incorporeal events that have 
been produced as they slowly give way to further events that are being produced.
Conversely, Chronos is “the present which alone exists. It makes the past and future its two oriented 
dimensions, such that one goes always from the past to the future.”70 As the time of bodies themselves, 
Chronos is “corporeal.”71 If Chronos as the present of bodies divides Aion into a past and future, it is 
because incorporeal events are only ever apprehended or experienced by bodies, never by other events. It 
is therefore only relative to bodies that a distinction can be made between events that once were and events 
that then happened. Yet it is not enough to contend that bodies have their own ‘present’ in which they 
persist. As discussed, it must be the case that bodies are produced and altered by the incorporeal events 
that they encounter. Aion and Chronos must therefore be mutually involved.
The first aspect of this link is that incorporeal events are produced by bodies. In Deleuze’s words, Aion 
is a “climbing to the surface” of the “depths.”72 Yet these bodies are no unchanging entities. Their present 
is a “variable living present,” such that there is a “becoming of depths.”73 This variation or becoming has 
not one but two aspects, such that there are in fact “two presents of Chronos.”74 This is because Chronos 
“expresses the action of bodies and the creation of corporeal qualities.”75 Since bodies were defined as 
causes, we know that the ‘action’ of bodies is their production of incorporeal events. Chronos leads to 
Aion: behind any incorporeal event lurks a body that is producing it. The creation of corporeal qualities is 
the (re)production or alteration of bodies themselves. Since we already know that bodies never encounter 
other bodies directly (not even themselves), this must be due to incorporeal events. Aion must thus also 
lead to Chronos. In Deleuze’s terms, the present or Chronos “gathers together and absorbs the past and 
the future.”76 He also calls this process of Chronos (bodies) drawing Aion (events) into itself “devouring,” 
“blending,” or “incorporation.”77 Bodies are thus created and altered by the very incorporeal events that 
they initially produce. Hence Chronos is an internal and deep time that cannot be reduced to the time of 
incorporeal events, but it is equally true that it is also the time of bodies being affected by those very events. 
As Deleuze writes, Chronos therefore expresses “the revenge taken by future and past on the present in 
terms of the present, because these are the only terms it comprehends and the only terms that affect it.”78 
67 Ibid., 168.







75 Ibid., 165, emphasis added.
76 Ibid., 5, cf. 61.
77 Ibid., 132, 162, 168.
78 Ibid., 164.
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That bodies are affected by events ‘in terms of the present’ – i.e. in terms of themselves – points to the fact 
that whether or how events alter the qualities of a body hinges on those very qualities. Here, too, bodies are 
causes, as their own malleable nature determines whether and how events will be registered, as well as the 
extent to which such events cause real change in a body.
This gives us the full model of twofold time. Any given body registers, apprehends, or experiences an 
unbroken succession of interwoven incorporeal events. This succession is Aion, the first aspect of time, and 
it is unbroken precisely because it only ever manifests events, never bodies themselves. It is a succession 
of the past into the future, a series of events that have been produced and that will be replaced by events 
that are then produced. The second aspect of time is Chronos, which concerns the production of events by 
bodies, as well as the persistence of these bodies and the (re)generation or alteration of their qualities.
Concretely, this means that anything I experience (or anything that any given body ever registers) is 
a succession that exclusively consists of products, of events manifested by bodies. This succession is the 
‘first’ time, and strictly speaking the production of events is utterly absent from this time. This is because 
the ‘link’ between a withdrawn body and the events that envelop it cannot be made present to another body 
(and also not to itself). The same is true for how the events that it registers affect and possibly alter a body 
and its qualities, because this ‘link’ is equally veiled behind the noticeable succession of events. Hence the 
‘process’ of bodies producing events and being reproduced or altered by those events implies a ‘second’ 
time, a circuit between bodies and events that withdraws behind the incorporeal envelopes of entities. It is 
this model of time that should be incorporated into object-oriented ontology.
5  The Two Times of Objects
To do so, we must first concede that time is not the tension between sensual objects and their qualities. Even 
our own experience of the sensual world always also includes the varying association and dissociation of 
sensual objects with each other, as we saw in the skyline example. Moreover, the dynamic duels between 
sensual objects and qualities do not exist in and of themselves, but only in relation to real objects that 
experience, apprehend, or register them. Since Harman regularly draws on Husserl to theorize sensual 
objects and qualities, we can rename the tension between a sensual object and its qualities ‘adumbration.’ 
The next step is to graft Deleuze’s twofold model of time onto Harman’s fourfold ontic structure.
Time is then no longer a tension between two of the four aspects of objects. Time is a twofold, and 
each of its two aspects or forms involves a real object with its real qualities on the one hand and sensual 
objects with their sensual qualities on the other hand. Put differently, time is a twofold dynamic between 
the withdrawn twofold of objects and the manifest twofold of objects.
The first aspect of time according to Deleuze was Aion, the varying play of incorporeal events and their 
qualities that is apprehended by bodies. In OOO, this becomes the varying play of sensual objects and their 
qualities as apprehended by real objects. Here, too, there is a sense in which the sensual world is not the 
present, but rather the transition of the past into the future. OOO holds that sensual objects are translations 
of the real objects that lurk behind them. What any entity apprehends or experiences are therefore sensual 
objects that real objects have produced, and these can only ever be replaced by further sensual objects 
that real objects then produce. What remains present throughout this succession is the real object that 
registers this variation. As Deleuze indicated, a real object always experiences this succession on its own 
terms, because whether and how an object registers sensual events depends on the real qualities that it 
has. This incorporates the first aspect of time into OOO, but let us do away with Deleuze’s overly theatrical 
terminology and call this aspect manifest time.
The second aspect of time was Chronos, the time of the production of incorporeal events by real bodies 
as well as the reproduction or alteration of those bodies as they register incorporeal events. Chronos is 
thus the temporal circuit between bodies and events. For OOO, this becomes the production of sensual 
objects and their qualities by real objects and their qualities as well as the reproduction or alteration of 
qualified real objects as they register qualified sensual objects. It is the circuit between the withdrawn half 
of objects and the sensual half of objects. Let us rename it to internal time. Both ‘directions’ of this circuit 
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are already acknowledged in OOO. On the one hand, sensual objects and their qualities are translations of 
the real objects that they envelop. This implies that sensual objects are produced by real objects, based on 
the real qualities of the latter. On the other hand, we saw that a real object’s encounter with sensual objects 
can result in real change to former’s real qualities, as there exist “relatively rare events that transform an 
object’s very reality.”79 We also saw that the unilateral openness of real objects is the condition for the 
possibility of such change.
This does, however, cast some doubt on Harman’s thesis that real change (alteration of an object’s real 
qualities) is rare. It seems more adequate to say that whereas significant real change is rare, incremental 
real change might be quite common. If a real object is open to all its sensual encounters, then it must also 
be possible that such an encounter leads to slight alterations of an object’s real qualities, just as it must be 
possible that it simply leads to the regeneration rather than alteration of such qualities. And of course, it 
is also entirely possible that a sensual encounter has absolutely no effect on an object, precisely because a 
real object has real qualities. As Harman writes, objects “push back against whatever circumstances they 
face.”80 Because of the real qualities that I have (or rather, am), I may be highly responsive to one experience 
that thereby ends up profoundly changing me, whereas some other experience may not leave the slightest 
trace on my being.
Also note that whereas it is not necessary that a real object always manifests a sensual surface (as it can 
simply be the case that no other object currently registers it), it does seem to be necessary that a real object 
always registers at least some sensual objects if it is to persist. Harman already seems to acknowledge that 
real objects are generated and regenerated by what they encounter: “every entity has a definite qualitative 
character, and I would claim that to have such a character must mean to be articulated or constructed by 
pieces.”81 These pieces have to be sensual objects. After all, objects are the only possible ground for the 
existence of entities in OOO, and sensual objects are the only kind of objects that can affect a real object. 
Even if an object somehow manages to take care of its own persistence by regenerating itself, this must play 
out in terms of that real object producing a sensual object that is then encountered by itself. By analogy, 
take the example of ‘finding the strength’ in oneself to persist during times of hardship. This cannot be a 
case of you ‘tapping into yourself’ as a real object. It must take the form of you supplying yourself with a 
sensual object (a thought, a memory, or a vague feeling) that allows you to persist. We should also note that 
this does not undermine real objects into the sensual objects that regenerate them, because there exists a 
difference in kind between the two dimensions of objects. If the generation of sensual objects by real objects 
is a matter of translation, then the same is true for the ‘incorporation’ of the force or impact of sensuous 
encounters into the real object.
As stated in the previous section, this twofold theory of time for OOO implies that objects engage in 
three temporal syntheses.82 Each synthesis involves manifest time as well as internal time. First, real objects 
produce qualified sensual objects that are contracted into the unbroken succession of the experiences or 
apprehensions of (other) real objects. Recall the example of more and more sensual objects that are gradually 
added to an observer’s experience of a skyline. Second, real objects and their qualities are maintained and 
possibly (slightly or significantly) altered by the succession of qualified sensual objects that they encounter. 
Third, whenever a real object forges a relation with a sensual object, this immediately implies the generation 
of a new real object. As Harman writes, “every genuine relation forms a new object.”83 According to OOO, 
when I perceive a building, strike up a conversation with a friend, or think of my hometown, the perception, 
the conversation, and the thought are not just relations. They are full-blown real entities that cannot be 
reduced to either myself or the sensual objects ‘on the other end’. Such new objects are also immediately 
immersed in the twofold of time, and this constitutes the final ingredient of the temporal dynamics of 
79 Harman, Immaterialism, 45.
80 Ibid., 55.
81 Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos,” 5, cf. 15.
82 Whether or not the following fully accords with how temporal syntheses are defined in Deleuze’s works is a question that I 
reserve for another time.
83 Harman, Time, Space, Essence and Eidos, 13.
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reality. Objects synthesize the sensual world, objects are synthesized as the sensual world affects them, and 
objects synthesize new objects as they relate to the sensual world.
Note that enriching OOO with a twofold of manifest time and internal time leaves the fourfold 
structure of objects completely intact. The question is now whether this twofold theory in time is an 
adequate response to Gratton’s and Wolfendale’s criticisms. The first point was that it must account for 
the production, alteration, and annihilation of qualified real objects. We have seen that internal time is 
indeed the condition for the possibility of such events. The second point concerned the temporality of the 
ten links between the aspects of the fourfold. Given that the combined effect of internal time and manifest 
time includes every aspect of the fourfold, this is now also accounted for. Finally, the twofold theory of time 
had to account for the persistence of objects without positing a time that would exist over and above them. 
This, too, is accounted for by the twofold theory of time. Objects persist or perish in so far as they are (not) 
regenerated by the sensual objects that they apprehend, which is to say upon which they draw, and this is 
warranted by the unilateral openness of real objects in conjunction with their internal time.
6  Conclusion
Embracing a Deleuzian twofold theory of time will increase the coherence and consistency of Harman’s 
object-oriented ontology. The fact that the former can be grafted onto the latter may also lead us to 
reconsider the relative distance between Harman’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. Harman has argued that if 
continental metaphysicians were neatly divided into specific schools of thought, he and Deleuze would be 
placed in different ones.84 Harman gives several reasons for this, but what interests us here is that one of 
those reasons is their apparently incompatible notions of time and becoming. In OOO, objects are the basic 
constituents of reality. If it is the case that nothing (except for other objects) precedes objects, then all of 
time must by definition be a dynamic among well-formed entities.
Conversely, Harman holds that a defining trait of “philosophers of becoming” such as Deleuze is that they 
put all of time prior to well-formed objects.85 Such philosophers would hold that “entities are […] just derivative 
outcroppings of some deeper pre-individual becoming.”86 Beneath or beyond our world of discontinuous 
objects, they posit a continuity of dynamic processes as well as a continuous time. Harman writes:
A philosopher of becoming is one who denies that the world is best understood in terms of individual things or individual 
instants of time. Instead, the world is a pre-individual field not fully carved up into distinct entities, and time is a conti-
nuous duration rather than a series of isolated cinematic frames.87
On this view, real time has always already happened by the time one gets to actual and discrete entities, 
because time pertains to the continuity of pre-individual processes that give rise to such entities. Philosophies 
of becoming therefore place well-formed objects at the end of time, as time then exclusively pertains to 
everything that happens before an actual entity finds itself expressed in the world. Harman here finds 
himself in agreement with Peter Hallward’s well-known reading of Deleuze’s virtual realm metaphysics: 
“since it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, there is no place in Deleuze’s 
philosophy for any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by actuality.”88
The notions of a virtual realm and a time that fully precedes individuals are obviously anathema to 
OOO. Yet at the same time, we have seen that a Deleuzian theory of time is commensurable with an object-
oriented ontology, and that the latter even gains in consistency if it incorporates the former. How can this 
be? The obvious answer is that Harman’s OOO is indeed incommensurable with Deleuze’s metaphysics, but 
this incommensurability chiefly concerns the metaphysics that we find in Difference and Repetition. As with 




88 Hallward, Out of this World, 162.
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any great philosopher, Deleuze’s thought evolved throughout his books. We already discussed how Deleuze 
came to dismiss the virtual realm as theorized in Difference and Repetition as ‘archaic.’ Moreover, we saw that 
The Logic of Sense is premised on a notion of ‘bodies’ as substances and causes that ‘withdraw’ themselves, 
meaning that these bodies are ontologically veiled by superficial ‘envelopes’ or ‘events.’ And far from embracing 
a single and continuous time in a virtual depth, this ontology of bodies and surfaces implied that “time must 
be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions.”89 This is the point where 
compatibilities between OOO and Deleuzian metaphysics start to arise. And in fact, what else would one call 
the increasing focus on bodies, machines, and assemblages in Deleuze’s works after Difference and Repetition 
than an increasing orientation towards objects?90 In light of the preceding analysis, the question may very well 
not be whether or not Deleuze’s and Harman’s philosophies overlap, but rather how much they actually do.
One final remark, then, on the many criticisms of OOO that were mentioned at the outset of this article. 
If it is possible to address and remedy the problem of time in OOO, and if this provide an adequate response 
to what Gratton and Wolfendale consider to be the worst problem currently haunting OOO, then it stands 
to reason that other less damning flaws in the theory can be remedied as well. In my view at least, the 
notion that reality might be a multitude of malleable entities that can neither be reduced to some privileged 
layer, substance, or structure, nor dissolved into the manifold of their operations remains sufficiently fresh, 
compelling, and above all disturbing to warrant further analysis.
Bibliography
Brassier, Ray. “Postscript: Speculative Autopsy.” In Object-Oriented Philosophy, Peter Wolfendale, 407-422. Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2014.
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
Deleuze, Gilles and Parnet, Claire. Dialogues. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987.
Deleuze, Gilles. Two Regimes of Madness – Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. Translated and edited by Ames Hodges and Mike 
Taormina. New York: Semiotext(e), 2006.
Deleuze, Gilles. Proust and Signs – The Complete Text. Translated by Richard Howard. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000.
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Translated by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
Garcia, Tristan. “Crossing Ways of Thinking: On Graham Harman’s System and My Own.” Translated by Mark Allan Ohm. 
Parrhesia. 16 (2013), 14-25.
Gratton, Peter. Speculative Realism – Problems and Prospects. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
Hallward, Peter. Out of This World – Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. London: Verso, 2006.
Harman, Graham. Object-Oriented Ontology – A New Theory of Everything. London: Pelican, 2018.
Harman, Graham. Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.
Harman, Graham. “Strange Realism: On Behalf of Objects.” The Humanities Review. 12:1 (2015), 3-18.
Harman, Graham. “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z.” In The Lure of Whitehead, Nicholas Gaskill and A.J. Nocek, 231-248. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
Harman, Graham. “The Road to Objects.” Continent. 3:1 (2011), 171-179.
Harman, Graham. The Quadruple Object. Winchester: Zero Books, 2010.
Harman, Graham. “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos: A New Theory of Causation.” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural 
and Social Philosophy. 6:1 (2010), 1-17.
Harman, Graham. Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things. Chicago: Open Court, 2005.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. “The Principles of Philosophy, or, The Monadology.” In Philosophical Essays, translated and edited 
by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber, 213-224. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1989.
Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time – A Critical Introduction and Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011
Wolfendale, Peter. Object-Oriented Philosophy – The Noumenon’s New Clothes. Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014.
89 Ibid., 5, cf. 132.
90 Deleuze clearly states that machines “constitute the Real in itself” (Anti-Oedipus, 52-53), and that the assemblage is “the 
minimum real unit” (Dialogues, 51).
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/19 9:15 AM
